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OPTIMAL BUY-AND-HOLD STRATEGIES FOR FINANCIAL
MARKETS WITH BOUNDED DAILY RETURNS∗
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Abstract. In the context of investment analysis, we formulate an abstract online computing
problem called a planning game and develop general tools for solving such a game. We then use
the tools to investigate a practical buy-and-hold trading problem faced by long-term investors in
stocks. We obtain the unique optimal static online algorithm for the problem and determine its
exact competitive ratio. We also compare this algorithm with the popular dollar averaging strategy
using actual market data.
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1. Introduction. In an online problem, an online algorithm B is given one
input at a time from a sequence of inputs. B takes an action on each input before
seeing any remaining input. In contrast, an off-line algorithm sees the entire input
sequence before it takes any action. Each action yields a positive accumulation. Let
E denote the set of all admissible input sequences. Let C(~e) denote the (expected)
total accumulation of an online or offline algorithm C on ~e ∈ E. Let A denote the
optimal offline algorithm, i.e., one that produces the largest total accumulation on
each admissible input sequence. In competitive analysis [4, 25, 27], B’s performance is
measured by its competitive ratio
ΥB = sup
~e∈E
A(~e)
B(~e)
. (1.1)
The online player seeks to minimize this ratio by choosing a suitable B while the
adversary attempts to maximize it by picking ~e after examining B. This paper assumes
that the adversary is oblivious, i.e., it fixes the input sequence before B performs any
computation such as generating random bits.
A planning game is an abstract online problem where the length of the input
sequence is fixed and known a priori to B. This time horizon feature captures many
important online problems including those for portfolio rebalancing [7, 8, 21], asset
trading [2, 5, 11, 12], secretary selection [1, 6, 13, 16], and bipartite matching [15, 17].
A planning game is finite if the numbers of admissible sequences of actions and inputs
are both finite; otherwise, it is infinite. A finite planning game corresponds to a linear
programming problem, where an optimal randomized online algorithm corresponds to
an optimal feasible solution. Consequently, we can show that the smallest competitive
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Exchange Circuit Breaker
α−1 β
Amsterdam 90% 110%
Bangkok 90% 110%
Paris 95% 110%
Taipei 93% 107%
Tel-Aviv 95% 110%
Tokyo 95% 130%
Vienna 95% 105%
Fig. 1.1. Circuit breaker rules in various exchanges.
ratio of any randomized online algorithm for such a game is the reciprocal of the value
of the game as a zero-sum two-person game.
In this general optimization framework, we investigate the buy-and-hold trading
problem defined as follows. An investor starts with some capital, which is normalized
to 1 dollar, and trades it for a certain security over n days, which is referred to as
the investment horizon. To avoid triviality, we assume n ≥ 2. On each day, the
security has only one exchange rate, i.e., the number of shares of the security which
one unit of capital can buy. Upon seeing the exchange rate, the investor executes one
transaction for that day and may trade all or part of the remaining capital. All the
capital must be traded by the n-th day, and converting the acquired security back to
capital is prohibited. The total accumulation of the investor is the number of shares
of the security she accumulates at the end of the investment horizon. Note that the
competitive ratio between the adversary’s and the investor’s accumulations is exactly
the competitive ratio between the dollar values of the accumulations. This problem is
faced by millions of investors who save for retirement purposes on a long-term basis;
for instance, a widely popular security for today’s investors would be a stock index
fund.
We employ the bounded daily return model, in which the next day’s exchange rate
e′ depends on the current day’s exchange rate e with e/β ≤ e′ ≤ eα for some fixed
α, β > 1. The values n, α, and 1/β are known a priori to the investor. We call α and
1/β the daily return bounds. Figure 1 gives some stock markets which enforce such
ratios through circuit breakers. This model can also be regarded as an approximation
to the geometric Brownian motion model used extensively in the finance community
[3, 9, 14, 18, 20, 24, 26].
A static algorithm is an online algorithm for the buy-and-hold trading problem
such that for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the (expected) amount of dollars invested by the algorithm on
the i-th day is the same for all exchange rate sequences. A dynamic algorithm refers
to any online algorithm for the problem, which is not necessarily static. The static
buy-and-hold trading problem refers to the case of the problem where the investor
can only use a static algorithm.
We prove that the smallest possible competitive ratio for any randomized or de-
terministic static algorithm is nαβ−(n−1)(α+β)+(n−2)
αβ−1 . We also obtain a deterministic
static algorithm with this competitive ratio, called the balanced strategy, and prove
that it is the only optimal deterministic static algorithm. In comparison, the popular
dollar averaging strategy has a strictly greater competitive ratio and thus is not op-
timal. The balanced strategy is so simple that it can be executed even by those who
are not mathematically sophisticated. Starting with one dollar initially, the algorithm
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invests α(β−1)
nαβ−(n−1)(α+β)+(n−2) dollar on the first day,
(α−1)β
nαβ−(n−1)(α+β)+(n−2) dollar on
the last day, and (α−1)(β−1)
nαβ−(n−1)(α+β)+(n−2) dollar on each of the other days.
Previously, El-Yaniv et al [10–12] obtained optimal online algorithms for this
unidirectional trading problem under the assumption that the daily exchange rates,
instead of the daily returns, are between a pair of upper and lower bounds. Al-Binali
[2] further studied the same setting in a framework of risk and reward [19]. Our
model and that of El-Yaniv et al are each formulated for real but different regulations
of stock and foreign currency markets. A subtle difference between these models
is that their model fixes a upper bound and a lower bound on the daily exchange
rates globally for the entire investment horizon, while our model sets new bounds
dynamically every day. Interestingly, although this difference might seem minor, they
give rise to mathematical results of very distinct flavors using significantly different
techniques.
Section 2 discusses how to compute optimal randomized online algorithms for
finite planning games. Section 3 uses the general analysis in §2 to derive the balanced
strategy and compare it with the dollar averaging strategy. Section 4 concludes the
paper with some open problems.
2. General analysis of finite planning games. A finite planning game G can
be regarded as a finite zero-sum two-person game ΓH(m,n) defined as follows. For
any integer k > 0, let Zk = {1, 2, . . . , k}. The maximizing player is the online player,
whose pure strategies are the deterministic online algorithms Bi of G indexed with
i ∈ Zm. The minimizing player is the adversary of G, whose pure strategies are the
input sequences ~σj of G indexed with j ∈ Zn. The payoff matrix1 H of ΓH(m,n) is
defined by
H(i, j) =
Bi(~σj)
A(~σj)
> 0, i ∈ Zm and j ∈ Zn. (2.1)
Let Φ(Zk) be the set of all probability density functions defined on Zk. For k = n or
m, each h ∈ Φ(Zk) is regarded as a point in the k-dimensional Euclidean space and
represents a mixed strategy that applies the ℓ-th pure strategy indexed by Zk with
probability h(ℓ). By von Neumann’s minimax theorem [22],
max
f∈Φ(Zm)
min
g∈Φ(Zn)
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
f(i)g(j)H(i, j) = min
g∈Φ(Zn)
max
f∈Φ(Zm)
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
f(i)g(j)H(i, j)
= max
f∈Φ(Zm)
min
j∈Zn
m∑
i=1
f(i)H(i, j) (2.2)
= min
g∈Φ(Zn)
max
i∈Zm
n∑
j=1
g(j)H(i, j),
which is called the value v∗ of ΓH(m,n).
1In Equation (1.1), we use
A(~e)
B(~e)
instead
B(~e)
A(~e)
so that the competitive ratios of different online
algorithms are greater than 1 and therefore are easier to distinguish visually in Figures 3.5 and 3.8.
In contrast, in Equation (2.1), we choose
Bi(~σj)
A(~σj)
instead of
A(~σj)
Bi(~σj)
in order to simplify the linear
algebra involved.
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Let r∗ be the smallest possible competitive ratio of any randomized online algo-
rithm for G; i.e.,
r∗ = min
f∈Φ(Zm)
max
j∈Zn
A(~σj)∑m
i=1 f(i)Bi(~σj)
.
A randomized online algorithm is optimal if its competitive ratio is r∗.
The next theorem relates G and ΓH(m,n).
Theorem 2.1.
1. r∗ = 1
v∗
.
2. An optimal mixed strategy of the online player of ΓH(m,n) induces an optimal
randomized online algorithm for G, and vice versa.
Proof. This theorem follows from Equation (2.2).
In light of Theorem 2.1, we use G and ΓH(m,n) interchangeably. A main purpose
of this paper is to derive the exact value of r∗ and an optimal randomized online
algorithm for G. To do so by means of Theorem 2.1, the primal and dual problems of
ΓH(m,n) or G are defined as follows:
Primal: Dual:
minimize xTum maximize y
Tun
subject to xTH ≥ uTn subject to Hy ≤ um
x ≥ 0 y ≥ 0
where uk is the column vector of k copies of 1.
For each j ∈ Zn, let Hj denote the j-th column of H . Moreover, let X and Y
be the sets of feasible solutions to the primal and dual problems of G, respectively.
Let X¯ and Y¯ be the sets of optimal feasible solutions to these problems. Let X∗ and
Y ∗ be the sets of optimal mixed strategies of the online player and the adversary,
respectively.
The next lemma is useful for computing an optimal randomized online algorithm
for G and its competitive ratio via linear programming.
Lemma 2.2.
1. For all nonzero x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , x
xTum
and y
yTun
are mixed strategies for
the online player and the adversary, respectively.
2. minx∈X x
Tum = r
∗ = maxy∈Y y
Tun.
3. X∗ = 1
r∗
·X¯ 6= ∅, and Y ∗ = 1
r∗
·Y¯ 6= ∅.
4. For each nonzero x ∈ X, if j ∈ Zn satisfies xTHj = minℓ∈Zn x
THℓ, then ~σj
is a worst-case input sequence for the online player’s mixed strategy x
xTum
.
Proof. This lemma follows from Theorem 2.1 and basics of linear programming
[22].
The next fact is useful for analyzing the uniqueness of an optimal randomized
online algorithm for G.
Fact 2.3 (see [23]). For any x ∈ X¯ and y ∈ Y¯ , x and y are extreme points of the
convex polyhedra X¯ and Y¯ if and only if there is a square submatrix H ′ = (hij)i∈I,j∈J
of H for some I ⊆ Zm and J ⊆ Zn with the following properties:
1. H ′ is nonsingular.
2.
∑
i∈I hijxi = 1 for all j ∈ J .
3.
∑
j∈J hijyj = 1 for all i ∈ I.
4. For all i 6∈ I, xi = 0.
5. For all j 6∈ J , yj = 0.
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The next theorem combines Lemma 2.2 and Fact 2.3 for the case m = n.
Theorem 2.4. Assume that m = n and H−1 exists. Let x = (uTnH
−1)T and
y = H−1un. Further assume x ≥ 0 and y ≥ 0. Let b =
x
xTun
.
1. Then, x and y are optimal feasible solutions to the primal and dual problems
of G, respectively.
2. ΥB = r
∗ = xTun, where B is the randomized online algorithm corresponding
to the online player’s mixed strategy b; in other words, B is optimal for G.
3. For all j = 1, . . . , n,
A(~σj)
B(~σj)
= ΥB; i.e., B has the same performance relative
to the adversary’s on every input sequence.
4. If every component of x and y is strictly greater than 0, then x and y are
the only optimal feasible solutions to the primal and dual problems of G, and
consequently, B is the only optimal randomized online algorithm.
Proof.
Statement 1. By direct verification, x ∈ X and y ∈ Y . Then, since xTun =
(yTun)
T = yTun, by Lemma 2.2(2) x ∈ X¯ and y ∈ Y¯ .
Statement 2. Note that xTun = r
∗ by Statement 1 and Lemma 2.2(2). Then, by
Statement 1 and Lemma 2.2(3), b is an optimal mixed strategy of the online player.
Thus, this statement follows from Theorem 2.1.
Statement 3. As pointed out in Statement 2, xTun = r
∗. By direct evaluation
and Statement 2, bTH = 1
r∗
un =
1
ΥB
un. Then, this statement follows from the fact
that by definition, the j-th component of bTH equals
B(~σj)
A(~σj)
.
Statement 4. To prove the uniqueness of B, by Theorem 2.1(2) and Lemma 2.2(3),
it suffices to show that X¯ has a unique element. By basics of linear programming [22],
X¯ has only a finite number of extreme points, and any element in X is a finite convex
combination of these extreme points. Thus, it suffices to show that x is the only
extreme point of X¯ as follows. Since H−1 exists, x and y are extreme points of X¯
and Y¯ by Fact 2.3 with I = J = Zn. On the other hand, let z be any extreme point
of X¯. Since y is an extreme point of Y¯ , there is a square submatrix H ′ = (hij)i∈I,j∈J
of H such that z and y satisfy the five conditions in Fact 2.3. Since yj > 0 for j ∈ Zn,
J = Zn by Condition 5. Since H
′ is square, I = Zn and H
′ = H . Then, by Condition
2, zTH = uTn . Since x
TH = uTn , we have z = x as desired.
3. Optimal static algorithms. This section applies the general tools in §2 to
the static buy-and-hold trading problem to derive the smallest possible competitive
ratio for static algorithms.
3.1. Notations. As specified in §1, the investor in the buy-and-hold trading
problem is given α, β, and n prior to an n-day investment horizon.
For i ∈ Zn, let ei be the given security’s exchange rate on the i-th day of the
investment horizon. Let e0 be the exchange rate on the 0-th day, i.e., the day right
before the investment horizon. Without loss of generality, we normalize e0 to 1 to sim-
plify the discussion. An admissible exchange rate sequence is any ~e = 〈e1, e2, . . . , en〉
where ei ∈ [ei−1β−1, ei−1α].
As in §1, let E denote the set of all admissible exchange rate sequences. Let A
denote the optimal offline trading algorithm. Let B be the investor’s online trading
algorithm. After the adversary examines B but before the investor starts executing B,
the adversary picks and fixes some ~e ∈ E. On the i-th day for i ∈ Zn, upon seeing ei, B
decides the amount of remaining capital to be traded for shares of the security without
knowing any future exchange rate, i.e., ej with j > i. Note that A(~e) = max1≤i≤n ei,
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Fig. 3.1. The downturns.
and B(~e) =
∑n
i=1 aiei, where ai is the (expected) amount of dollars invested by B on
the i-th day and depends only on the current and past exchange rate e1, e2, . . . , ei.
For i ∈ Zn, the algorithm Si which trades the entire initial capital of one dollar
on the i-th day is called the trade-once algorithm on the i-th day. Note that Si is
static and Si(~e) = ei.
Let S be a randomized static algorithm. Let si be the expected amount of dollars
invested by S on the i-th day. Note that si ≥ 0 for all i and
∑n
i=1 si = 1. Thus, let
S ′ be the deterministic static algorithm that invests si on the i-the day. Also, since
the amounts s1, . . . , sn define a probability density function in Φ(Zn), let S ′′ be the
randomized static algorithm that applies Si with probability si.
Lemma 3.1. S, S ′, and S ′′ are equivalent in the sense that for all ~e ∈ E,
S(~e) = S ′(~e) = S ′′(~e).
Proof. Straightforward.
By Lemma 3.1, we identify S,S ′, and S ′′. Also, let r∗s be the smallest competitive
ratio for the static algorithms; then by Lemma 3.1,
r∗s = inf
f∈Φ(Zn)
sup
~e∈E
A(~e)∑n
i=1 f(i)Si(~e)
. (3.1)
3.2. Reduction to finite games. The static buy-and-hold trading problem
is an infinite planning game because the adversary has an infinite number of pure
strategies, while by Lemma 3.1 the online player has n pure strategies Si. In order
to use the tools in §2, we need to reduce the game to a finite one by eliminating the
adversary’s dominated pure strategies, i.e., non-worst-case exchange rate sequences,
so that the remaining exchange rate sequences are finite in number.
For j = 1, . . . , n, let
~ej = 〈
j︷ ︸︸ ︷
α, α2, . . . , αj ,
n−j︷ ︸︸ ︷
αjβ−1, αjβ−2, . . . , αjβj−n〉.
We call these n exchange rate sequences the downturns; see Figure 3.1 for an illustra-
tion.
Lemma 3.2.
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1. Given a static algorithm S, each ~e ∈ E is dominated by downturn ~ej, i.e.,
A(~e)
S(~e) ≤
A(~ej)
S(~ej)
, where ej = max
n
i=1 ei.
2. The smallest competitive ratio for the static algorithms is
r∗s = inf
f∈Φ(Zn)
max
1≤j≤n
A(~ej)∑n
i=1 f(i)Si(~ej)
.
3. The static buy-and-hold trading problem can be regarded as a finite zero-sum
two-person game ΓK(n, n) with the payoff matrix K defined by K(i, j) = α
i−j
if i ≤ j or βj−i if i > j, i.e.,
K =


1 α−1 α−2 · · · α1−n
β−1 1 α−1 · · · α2−n
β−2 β−1 1 · · · α3−n
...
...
...
. . .
...
β1−n β2−n β3−n · · · 1


.
Proof. Statement 1 follows from the fact that
ej
ei
≤ αj−i if i ≤ j and ej
ei
≤ βi−j
otherwise. Statement 2 follows from Equation (3.1) and Statement 1. For Statement 3,
we let Si be the online player’s i-th pure strategy; and let ~ej be the the adversary’s
j-th pure strategy. As in §2, the payoff matrix K is defined by K(i, j) = Si(~ej)
A(~ej)
. The
statement then follows from the facts that A(~ej) = αj and that Si(~ej) = αi if i ≤ j
or αjβj−i otherwise.
In light of Lemma 3.2, an optimal mixed strategy of the online player of ΓK(n, n)
corresponds to an optimal static algorithm. Thus, we next solve ΓK(n, n) to derive
an optimal static algorithm.
3.3. Deriving an optimal static algorithm.
Lemma 3.3. For n ≥ 2, det(K) = (1 − α−1β−1)n−1 > 0.
Proof. We use Kn to emphasize the dimension n of K. Let Aij be the submatrix
of Kn obtained by deleting row i and column j. To expand det(Kn) along the first
row of Kn, observe that A11 = Kn−1. Furthermore, the first column of A12 equals
β−1 times that of A11, while the other columns of A12 equal the corresponding ones
of A11; thus det(A12) = β
−1 det(A11). For j = 3, . . . , n, det(A1j) = 0 because
in A1j , the first column equals β
−1 times the second column. Hence, det(Kn) =
det(A11)−α−1 det(A12) = det(Kn−1)−α−1β−1 det(Kn−1) = (1−α−1β−1) det(Kn−1).
The lemma immediately follows by induction on n.
Let b∗ be the column vector of n components defined by
b∗i =


α(β−1)
nαβ−(n−1)(α+β)+(n−2) i = 1;
(α−1)(β−1)
nαβ−(n−1)(α+β)+(n−2) 1 < i < n;
(α−1)β
nαβ−(n−1)(α+β)+(n−2) i = n.
(3.2)
Since b∗ > 0 and b∗Tun = 1, b
∗ represents a mixed strategy of the online player. So
let BAL denote the static algorithm which applies Si with probability b
∗
i ; note that by
Lemma 3.1, BAL is equivalent to the deterministic static algorithm which invests b∗i
dollars on the i-th day. Let c∗ be the vector obtained by swapping the first and n-th
components of b∗. Similarly, c∗ > 0 and c∗Tun = 1, and we intend c
∗ to represent a
mixed strategy of the adversary.
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The next theorem analyzes BAL. In light of Statement 3 of the theorem, we call
BAL the balanced strategy.
Theorem 3.4. Let r = nαβ−(n−1)(α+β)+(n−2)
αβ−1 .
1. BAL is an optimal static algorithm, and ΥBAL = r
∗
s = r.
2. BAL is the only optimal static algorithm subject to the equivalence stated in
Lemma 3.1.
3. For j = 1, . . . , n,
A(~ej)
BAL(~ej)
= ΥBAL; in other words, BAL has the same perfor-
mance relative to the adversary’s on every downturn.
Proof. Let b¯ = rb∗, and c¯ = rc∗. By Lemma 3.3, K−1 exists. Below we prove
b¯T = uTnK
−1 and c¯ = K−1un. Then, Statement 1 follows from Theorem 2.4(2) and
the fact that b¯ ≥ 0, c¯ ≥ 0, and b¯Tun = r. Statement 2 follows from Theorem 2.4(4)
and the fact that every component of b¯ and c¯ is greater than 0. Statement 3 follows
from Theorem 2.4(3)
To prove b¯T = uTnK
−1 and c¯ = K−1un, observe that c¯ can be obtained by
swapping α and β in b¯, and the j-th column Kj of K can be obtained from the j-th
row of K by the same operation. Therefore, b¯TK = uTn if and only if Kc¯ = un, and
we only need to establish b¯TK = uTn . Since b¯
TK1 = 1 if and only if b¯TKn = 1, we
only show b¯TKj = 1 for 1 ≤ j < n as follows:
b¯TKj =
n∑
i=1
b¯iK(i, j)
=
1
αβ − 1

α(β − 1)α1−j + ∑
1<i≤j
(α− 1)(β − 1)αi−j+
∑
j<i<n
(α− 1)(β − 1)βj−i + (α− 1)ββj−n


=
1
αβ − 1
[
α2−j(β − 1) + (α− α2−j)(β − 1)+
(α− 1)(1− βj−n+1) + (α− 1)βj−n+1
]
=
1
αβ − 1
(αβ − 1)
= 1.
3.4. Comparison with the dollar averaging strategy. The dollar averaging
strategy (DA) is the static algorithm which invests an equal amount of capital, i.e., 1/n
dollars, on each trading day. Thus, by Lemma 3.1, DA is the uniformly mixed strategy
for the online player in the game ΓK(n, n). By Theorem 3.4, DA is not an optimal
static algorithm, and ΥBAL < ΥDA. The next lemma gives a closed-form formula of
ΥDA. Figure 3.2 plots the relationship between ΥDA and ΥBAL for 2 ≤ n ≤ 100.
Lemma 3.5. ΥDA = max
{
n(1−α−1)
1−α−n ,
n(1−β−1)
1−β−n
}
.
Proof. Let Bj =
∑n
i=1K(i, j). By Lemma 3.2, ΥDA = max1≤j≤n
n
Bj
. By algebra,
Bj+1 −Bj is a decreasing function of j. Thus, Bj is a function of j whose minimum
occurs at one end of the domain {1, . . . , n}. The lemma follows from this concavity.
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Fig. 3.2. The dashed and solid dotted lines denote ΥDA and ΥBAL, respectively, with α = 1/0.93
and β = 1.07.
We have also experimented with BAL and DA using Taiwan’s market data. As
shown in Figure 1, the Taipei Stock Exchange (TSE) adopts α = 1/0.93 and β = 1.07.
We select the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) and Acer
Computer Company (Acer) for experimental analysis. TSMC is the largest foundry
of wafer manufacturing in the world and is listed on both TSE and the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) under the symbol TSM. Acer is the world’s third largest PC
manufacturer as well as the fifth largest mobile PC manufacturer.
Figure 3.3 shows the daily closing prices of TSMC in 1997. All stock prices are
quoted in the New Taiwan dollar (NT dollar). One investment plan is executed each
month. Each plan buys shares of TSMC with an initial capital of one NT dollar as
in §3; however, the exchange rate of a day is the reciprocal of that day’s share price
without an initial normalization to one. A monthly accumulation is the total number
of shares acquired over a month. For ease of comparison, a monthly accumulation is
expressed in NT dollar by converting the acquired shares into NT dollars at the price
of the last trading day of each month. Figure 3.4 shows the monthly accumulations of
BAL and DA on TSMC for each month of 1997. Notice that BAL and DA are money-
making except in September, October, and December. Figure 3.5 shows the realized
competitive ratios of BAL and DA, which are the performance ratios as defined in
Equation (1.1) but with ~e set to the actual exchange rate sequences. Note that for all
twelve months, these ratios are less than 1.35. For visual clarity, we join the monthly
accumulations and competitive ratios by line segments, and use the solid and dotted
lines to denote the graphs of BAL and DA, respectively. Observe that overall, BAL
outperforms DA.
Figure 3.6 shows the daily closing prices of Acer in 1997. Figures 3.7 and 3.8
show the monthly accumulations and realized competitive ratios of BAL and DA,
respectively. The experimental results for Acer lead to similar conclusions to those
for TSMC.
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Fig. 3.3. TSMC’s daily closing stock prices in 1997.
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Accumulation
Fig. 3.4. Accumulations of BAL and DA on TSMC.
4. Open problems. We have presented the balanced strategy BAL and proved
its unique optimality among the static algorithms. Furthermore, each of its exact
competitive ratio and daily investment amounts has a closed-form expression which
takes O(1) time to evaluate. In light of these results, an immediate open problem is
whether there are similar results for dynamic online trading algorithms. There are
two orthogonal directions for further research as follows.
One direction is to change the assumption that the time horizon is fixed and
known a priori to B. For instance, it would be meaningful to consider the scenario
that there is a cash stream instead of a one-time capital at the beginning of the
investment horizon. For this scenario, an investor might need to guess when the cash
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Fig. 3.5. Realized competitive ratios of BAL and DA on TSMC.
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Fig. 3.6. Acer’s daily closing stock prices in 1997.
stream will end.
The other direction is to replace α and β with a known probability distribution
of the ratio e
′
e
. This would be an example of the standard approach in finance of con-
sidering the average-case performance under an assumed probabilistic model. While
the worst-case approach in computer science is unnecessarily pessimistic, the average-
case approach in finance is overly dependent on the chosen model. In general. it
would be of interest to combine these two approaches to formulate more informative
computational problems than either approach could.
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